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EVERYONE’S A LITTLE BIT RACIST? 
RECONCILING IMPLICIT BIAS AND TITLE VII 
Christopher Cerullo* 
 
Since its enactment as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII’s 
main purpose has been to end all forms of employment discrimination.  
Through a flexible judicial interpretation of Title VII that reached newly 
discovered forms of discrimination, and through occasional intervention by 
Congress to update the statute, Title VII has been largely successful in 
reducing and remedying instances of overt discrimination in the workplace.  
However, more recently, social scientists have analyzed and applied the 
results of Harvard’s Implicit Association Test to recognize a new form of 
discrimination characterized by a subconscious decisionmaking process 
based on intuition and a lack of an overt intent to discriminate.  This 
phenomenon is called “implicit bias.” 
To date, several courts have been receptive to incorporating an implicit 
bias-based theory of employment discrimination, seeing this as the next step 
in the battle to end all forms of discrimination.  Yet many other courts have 
remained skeptical of the impact of implicit bias and have refused to find 
that discrimination existed without a showing of intent, specific actions by 
an employer, or specific employment practices.  This Note examines the 
struggle courts face when analyzing potential instances of implicit bias, and 
suggests how implicit bias–based claims can be consistent with the existing 
Title VII intent-based framework and evaluated with minimal changes to 
that framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[T]here are . . . things which a man is afraid to tell even to himself, and 
every decent man has a number of such things stored away in his mind.”1 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 was enacted with the broad 
purpose of ending all forms of discrimination within the workplace.3  Over 
the course of almost sixty years, Title VII has effectively reduced and 
limited instances of overt and invidious employment discrimination through 
a flexible interpretation by the courts and a willingness to amend Title VII 
when new employment discrimination scenarios arise.4  When overt 
discrimination was the leading form of discrimination for which employees 
sought a remedy, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. burden-shifting framework to give employees a full and fair chance 
to raise and vet any appropriate employment discrimination claims.5  When 
seemingly neutral business practices had the unintended effect of 
 
 1. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND 39 (Richard Pevear & Larissa 
Volokhosky trans., Vintage Books 1993) (1864). 
 2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 3. See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 488 (2005). 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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discriminating against protected classes of employees, the Supreme Court 
(and later, Congress) developed the disparate impact framework to allow 
employees to challenge these practices without having to prove intent.6  
Eventually, it became apparent that employers could escape liability when a 
discriminatory intent accompanied a legitimate business purpose, so both 
the Supreme Court and Congress sought to update Title VII’s application by 
including a mixed-motive framework to allow employees to challenge these 
mixed intentions as at least partially discriminatory practices.7  As such, 
both the judiciary and Congress should be commended for the advancement 
of women and minorities in the workplace. 
Despite this, recent social science studies, led by various analyses of the 
Implicit Associations Test (IAT),8 have found that a somewhat newly 
discovered form of discrimination called “implicit bias”9 still pervades the 
workplace environment, often remaining completely unnoticed.10  Implicit 
biases in the workplace may take the form of a “gut feeling” in situations 
where two candidates are equally qualified for a position.  Depending on 
each candidate’s race, religion, gender, or other identifying characteristics, 
their qualifications may be weighted differently.11  When this phenomenon 
occurs, the decisionmaker is entirely unaware and rarely questions the 
legitimacy of this choice.  Through data collected from the IAT, researchers 
have discovered that these implicit biases are pervasive throughout our 
society and may play a large role in modern Title VII employment 
discrimination.12  Until implicit bias becomes more commonly recognized, 
little can be done to combat this new frontier in discrimination. 
 
 6. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 7. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 8. For an online version of the test, see PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://implicit.harvard.edu/
implicit/research (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).  The IAT is a sorting task that measures time 
differences in pairings of images (an African American male and a Caucasian male) and 
words (positive and negative). See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:  
A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2006).  
IAT takers must press one button for representation of “African American” and “negative” 
and another button for representation of “Caucasian” and “positive” and vice versa. See 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 971 
(2006).  Generally, IAT takers react faster when the Caucasian, rather than the African 
American, image is paired with the positive word. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 948–50 
(2006). 
 9. This Note uses the terms “implicit bias” and “unconscious bias” interchangeably to 
reduce confusion, since the courts evaluating this type of discrimination have done the same. 
 10. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness:  Implicit Bias 
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 487 (2010); see also infra Part I.B. 
 11. See infra Part I.B.  For example, if a male decisionmaker that holds an implicit bias 
against women is evaluating two equally qualified candidates, one male and one female, for 
a job that requires the employee to travel across the country often, that decisionmaker will 
select the male based on the gut feeling that he is more qualified.  However, the truth behind 
that gut feeling may be that the decisionmaker improperly assumes a woman would prefer to 
stay home tending to her husband and children, rather than travel extensively, regardless of 
the woman’s desire to work.  This hypothetical is based on the facts of Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 
277 F. Supp. 2d 973 (W.D. Wis. 2003). 
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
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However, state and federal courts have struggled to find the most 
effective way to evaluate whether an employer has unconsciously 
discriminated against an employee or job candidate, or whether the choice 
was merely based on some other legitimate factor.13  Many of these courts 
fall into one of two camps.  In the first, judges are skeptical of implicit bias 
evidence and hesitate to find an employer liable for unintentional and 
unknown actions.14  These courts tend to reject implicit bias–based claims 
of employment discrimination, and instead favor any of the myriad 
alternatives for the outcome of an employment decision, such as business 
needs or subjective discretion.15  In the other camp, judges are more 
accepting of the implicit bias evidence and recognize the need to provide a 
remedy to employees or job candidates alleging these types of claims.16  
These courts are more amenable to the various employment discrimination 
claims, seeking either to evaluate them under the existing Title VII 
framework or a slightly modified Title VII framework.17  Nevertheless, 
without greater acceptance by either the courts or Congress, employees 
raising claims of implicit bias–based discrimination remain largely without 
a remedy. 
Part I of this Note explains the background against which Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted and the three major legal 
frameworks—disparate treatment, disparate impact, and mixed-motive 
discrimination—that courts developed and now use to evaluate potential 
violations of Title VII.  It also provides a description of implicit bias and its 
effects on workplace decisionmaking, and then explores the pros and cons 
of recognizing implicit bias as a type of discrimination contemplated by 
Title VII’s existing framework.  Part II analyzes how courts address 
allegations of implicit bias–based discrimination.  Finally, Part III argues 
that courts must definitively incorporate implicit bias into the Title VII 
analysis and describes how this new analysis is both consistent with and 
supported by the current purpose, language, and framework that courts 
already use to evaluate employment discrimination claims under Title VII. 
I.  TITLE VII’S NEWEST CHALLENGE:  IMPLICIT BIAS 
Since its enactment, the judiciary has taken an active role in interpreting 
Title VII to address various issues in employment discrimination cases as 
they arise.  Although the Supreme Court may not accept a new and original 
claim of employment discrimination immediately, the Court remains a 
strong driving force behind the interpretation of Title VII.  In turn, 
Congress has amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to recognize the 
Court’s decisions. 
 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
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This Part first describes the history of Title VII’s enactment, as well as 
the developments that led to the Supreme Court’s various modifications to, 
and interpretations of, the statute, including the disparate treatment, 
disparate impact, and mixed-motive discrimination frameworks.  It then 
explores the cognitive science discovery of implicit bias through the use of 
the IAT and the possible consequences of implicit bias in the workplace.  
Finally, this Part concludes by noting several arguments for and against 
recognizing implicit bias as a part of Title VII. 
A.  A Brief History of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The first federal governmental action against employment discrimination 
was an executive order signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 
1941.18  No further action was taken for nearly a decade.  Then, in the 
1950s, state legislatures interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision 
desegregating public schools in Brown v. Board of Education19 to mandate 
equal employment opportunity as well.20 
After a lengthy debate amongst the federal legislative and executive 
branches, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. 21  Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from making employment-related 
decisions, either directly or implicitly, on the basis of race, religion, or sex, 
among other protected classifications.22  Ultimately, Title VII’s overriding 
goal was to provide equal employment opportunities for all United States 
citizens by creating a broad set of protections against all forms of 
discrimination, both overt and subtle.23  Despite its goal of reducing 
employment discrimination, the word “discrimination” remains statutorily 
 
 18. PAUL BURSTEIN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS:  THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL 13 (1985). 
 19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), had 
unconstitutionally permitted racially separate but equal facilities to continue existing). 
 20. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:  VISIONS OF EQUALITY 
IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 4 (2d ed. 2007).  By the 1950s, many states had begun enacting 
fair employment practice laws, which would become a model for Title VII. Id.  These early 
state laws, however, were ineffectively enforced. Id. 
 21. For a brief history of the development of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from 1957 to 
1964, see THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:  BACKGROUND, STATUTES & PRIMER 12 (Irene Y. Capozzi 
ed., 2006). 
 22. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).  
Section 2000e-2(a) currently reads, in relevant part, 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate 
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or . . . in any way which would . . . otherwise adversely affect [that 
individual’s] status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.   
Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
 23. See Damon Ritenhouse, A Primer on Title VII:  Part One, ABA GPSOLO (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2013/january_2013/primer_title_vi
i_part_one.html (“[T]he central focus of Title VII became to dismantle tangible barriers that 
operate to disadvantage minority employees.”). 
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undefined to this day.24  This is partially because, by the 1940s, a general 
list of prohibited employment practices already existed.25  Additionally, the 
meaning of “discrimination” was later interpreted through early activist 
Supreme Court decisions.26  But once the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was 
enacted, Congress generally refrained from addressing employment 
discrimination, except for major amendments to Title VII in 1972 and 1991 
as a result of the aforementioned Supreme Court rulings.27 
As in the past, today’s Congress is unlikely to change the structural 
framework of Title VII without high levels of public support28 or strong 
judicial leadership to inspire updated legislation.29  As a consequence of 
congressional gridlock,30 the judiciary has become the de facto developer of 
Title VII.31  Through both its previous incarnations and in its current form, 
the language of Title VII has spawned many legal theories under which 
employees and job candidates can bring discrimination claims.  Moreover, 
courts still possess the ability to reinterpret Title VII when changed 
employment practices demand it. 
1.  Disparate Treatment 
The disparate treatment claim is the epitome of modern Title VII 
employment discrimination claims.  Disparate treatment occurs when an 
employer takes a specific action to treat an employee differently from 
others because of the employer’s discriminatory motive.32  The current 
 
 24. See, e.g., RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 11; Patrick S. Shin, Liability for 
Unconscious Discrimination?  A Thought Experiment in the Theory of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 80 (2010). Title VII was largely premised on the 
notion that courts or judges would recognize discriminatory practices when they arose. See 
RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 18–19. 
 25. BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 25.  Senator Hubert Humphrey, broadly defending the 
bill, stated, “[Title VII] does not limit the employer’s freedom to hire, fire, promote or 
demote for any reasons . . . so long as his action is not based on race.” 110 CONG. REC. 5423 
(1964). 
 26. See infra Part I.A.1–3; see also RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 11. 
 27. See, e.g., BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 35 (stating that Title VII was amended in 1972 
to provide the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with enforcement 
powers); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was 
amended to incorporate Supreme Court decisions regarding types of intentional 
discrimination).  Two theories offered for the lack of congressional action on Title VII are 
(1) that Congress believes that Title VII has effectively eliminated employment 
discrimination, and (2) that Congress is merely giving the law a chance to work before 
taking further action. BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 35–36.  However, given that Title VII was 
last amended over twenty years ago, some scholars question how well the statute has held up 
over time in actuality. See, e.g., Ritenhouse, supra note 23. 
 28. See BURSTEIN, supra note 18, at 62, 67. 
 29. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 20, at 13. 
 30. See, e.g., David Lawder, Democrats Hold Senate, Moderates Fade in Both Parties, 
REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:10 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-
campaign-senateidUSBRE8A60HE20121107?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc
=69. 
 31. See Ritenhouse, supra note 23. 
 32. See 1 CHARLES R. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACTIONS § 1:29 (2012); 1 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:  
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framework for evaluating a disparate treatment case was laid out by the 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 which created a 
three-step burden-shifting framework that was later refined in Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.34 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. involved Mr. Green, an African American 
mechanic and laboratory technician, who participated in organized protests 
against his employer’s allegedly racially motivated hiring practices after 
being laid off.35  After unsuccessfully reapplying at McDonnell Douglas, 
Green filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), claiming that racial discrimination was the true 
motive behind McDonnell Douglas’s refusal to rehire him.36  McDonnell 
Douglas responded that Green was not rehired because of his involvement 
in the protests.37 
Because the district court did not give Green an opportunity to respond to 
his employer’s reason for refusing to rehire him, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed, stating that employees should receive the opportunity to 
demonstrate that employers’ reasoning is simply a pretext.38  In affirming 
the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court set forth the modern burden-shifting 
framework, seeking to balance both the societal and individual interests of 
employers and employees alike.39 
The first step in the Court’s burden-shifting framework requires the 
employee to establish a prima facie case of Title VII employment 
discrimination40 by a preponderance of the evidence.41  This burden is “not 
onerous.”42  By raising a prima facie case, the employees create an 
inference that their employers discriminated against them.43  Once the 
employee establishes the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 
 
LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:2 (2009).  The Supreme Court has referred to this standard as “the 
most easily understood type of discrimination.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 
n.15 (1977)). 
 33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 34. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 35. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 794. 
 36. Id. at 796. 
 37. Id. at 797. 
 38. Id. at 797–98. 
 39. Id. at 801–02 (“The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and 
consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral 
employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is 
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”). 
 40. Id. at 802. Employees can make a prima facie case by alleging that they:  (1) belong 
to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) applied to and were qualified for an open job; 
(3) were qualified for the job and rejected; and (4) can state that the job remained open after 
their rejection and that the employer sought other employees with similar qualifications. Id. 
 41. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981). 
 42. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (quoting Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 253). But see Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (noting how difficult it is for employees 
to state a cause of action under the disparate treatment framework). 
 43. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253–54 (“The prima facie case serves an important function in 
the litigation:  it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
[employee’s] rejection.”). 
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employer, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its 
decision not to hire the employee.44  To meet this burden, the employer 
must merely present evidence that creates an issue of material fact 
regarding the reason for its employment decision.45  The ultimate goal of 
this step is to match the employee’s prima facie case of discrimination by 
creating a sufficiently clear and reasonably specific factual issue that the 
employee can fairly challenge as pretextual.46  Finally, the burden returns to 
the employee to demonstrate that the nondiscriminatory reason given by the 
employer is simply a pretext for discrimination.47  Throughout this burden-
shifting scheme, the ultimate question should always be whether the 
employee was intentionally discriminated against.48  Although the burden 
“shifts” between employee and employer, the ultimate burden of proving 
intentional discrimination at trial always remains with the employee.49 
Presently, the courts are more willing than in past years to grant summary 
judgment disposing of a disparate treatment discrimination claim in favor of 
the employer.50 
2.  Disparate Impact 
The first departure from the traditional Title VII employment 
discrimination claim came in the form of the disparate impact theory.  
While disparate treatment cases typically involve discriminatory actions and 
intent, disparate impact cases involve seemingly neutral actions that have a 
disproportionate impact on members of a protected class of persons—no 
discriminatory motive is required.51  The disparate impact burden-shifting 
 
 44. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The Court noted that a wide range of 
legitimate reasons, both objective and subjective, exist. See id. at 802–03. 
 45. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–55.  Specifically, the employer only has to explain why the 
decision was made or present evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. Id. at 
256 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978)). 
 46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56, 258. 
 47. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804 (“While Title VII does not, without 
more, compel rehiring of [an employee], neither does it permit [the employer] to use [an 
employee’s] conduct as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by [Title VII].”); 
see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (“[The employee] may succeed in this either directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or 
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”). 
Relevant evidence at this stage may include the employer’s general treatment of minorities 
or whether the employer treated similarly situated employees differently. See, e.g., 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804–05. 
 48. See, e.g., ROSSEIN, supra note 32, § 2:9; Lee, supra note 3, at 482 (“[T]he plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the employer was motivated by racial or other animus at the precise 
moment the adverse employment action was taken . . . .”). 
 49. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (“The . . . division of intermediate evidentiary burdens 
serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question 
[of intentional discrimination].”); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 
977, 986 (1988) (“[T]hese shifting burdens are meant only to aid courts and litigants in 
arranging the presentation of evidence . . . .”). 
 50. See Lee, supra note 3, at 482. 
 51. See ROSSEIN, supra note 32, § 2:30. 
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framework was first established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,52 and was 
formally adopted into Title VII in 1991.53 
In Griggs, Duke Power had a longstanding policy of refusing African 
American employees access to employment outside of the company’s labor 
department until 1955; employees within the labor department received the 
lowest wages of all employees.54  In 1955, Duke Power departed from its 
policy of outright exclusion by requiring all employees to have a high 
school diploma as a prerequisite for employment outside the labor 
department.55  Finally, in 1965, responding to the newly enacted Title VII, 
Duke Power provided an alternative to the diploma requirement in the form 
of a professionally designed high school equivalency exam.56  The African 
American employees brought a class action lawsuit against their employer, 
alleging that Duke Power’s policy violated Title VII.57  Although Duke 
Power had not engaged in any overt acts of intentional discrimination,58 the 
Supreme Court created a new framework to provide Duke Power’s African 
American employees with a remedy. 
Congress intended Title VII to reach the discriminatory effects of 
employment practices, not just the motivations behind them.59  Under 
Griggs’s disparate impact framework, employees must first demonstrate 
that a seemingly neutral business practice exists that has the effect of 
discriminating against a protected group.60  Neutral business practices 
include a broad range of objective activities, such as intelligence tests.61  In 
line with the holding in Griggs, employees may now challenge subjective 
practices and mixed objective-subjective practices as well.62  The employer 
can rebut the employee’s showing of discriminatory impact by 
demonstrating that the practice exists as a matter of business necessity or 
relevance to job performance.63  Finally, the employee can reject the 
 
 52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (stating that a disparate impact claim is 
established when “a complaining party demonstrates that [an employer] uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of [a protected 
characteristic] and the [employer] fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”); ROSSEIN supra 
note 32, § 2:30. 
 54. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426–27. 
 55. Id. at 427. 
 56. Id. at 427–28. 
 57. Id. at 426. 
 58. See id. at 428. The Fourth Circuit had held that, without evidence of intent, Duke 
Power could not have violated Title VII. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 
1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 59. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 60. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (discussing 
the employee’s need to identify an employment practice and prove it had a discriminatory 
impact); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”). 
 61. See ROSSEIN supra note 32, § 2:30. 
 62. See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. at 989–90. However, in cases of mixed objective-
subjective practices, the court will evaluate them as if they were purely subjective practices. 
Id. at 994. 
 63. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 997–98; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
136 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
employer’s rebuttal by demonstrating that a less discriminatory alternative 
practice exists, but the employer still refuses to utilize it.64  The relevant 
inquiry almost always takes place on a job-specific level.65 
Years later, the Supreme Court considered the role of statistics and the 
appropriate standards by which courts may evaluate statistical data in 
disparate impact cases.66  The Court recognized that, despite the utilities of 
statistical proof, some danger still existed when proving a disparate impact 
claim.67  As such, the Court recognized that a higher standard of proof 
would be required when evaluating statistical data to protect against any 
abuses, especially given statistical uncertainties.68  The Court also 
expressed some reluctance in the form of skepticism of the veracity of the 
statistical data presented by employees.69 
Additionally, in response to the need for a higher standard of proof, Title 
VII now provides that the courts may evaluate a claim based on whether an 
employee can point to a specific business practice—unless that practice 
cannot be separated into individual components.70 
Given the higher standard of proof, fewer cases of this type are currently 
being filed in state and federal courts.71 
3.  Mixed-Motive Discrimination 
Like disparate impact cases, mixed-motive cases were not recognized as 
part of Title VII until after the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.72 This recognition resulted, in part, from the Supreme Court’s own 
development of a mixed-motive framework and its subsequent 
 
 64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2006); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).  The court must additionally consider the costs and other 
burdens of that alternative practice when evaluating the strength of the employee’s claim. 
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. 
 65. See Pippen v. Iowa, No. LACL10738, slip op. at 8 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012), 
appeal filed, No. 12-0913 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2012). 
 66. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994–97. 
 67. Id. at 992.  The Court recognized that statistical proof could potentially have an 
unintended chilling effect on legitimate business practices. See id. at 993. 
 68. See id. at 992 (“It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination is 
the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accord with the laws of 
chance. It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or discover 
and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the 
composition of their workforces.” (citations omitted)).  However, the Court also refused to 
delineate a specific “mathematical formula” for determining when statistical proof satisfied 
the employee’s burden. Id. at 994–95 (“[S]tatistical disparities must be sufficiently 
substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.”). 
 69. See id. at 996–97 (stating that courts are not forced to accept employees’ statistical 
evidence and that employers are free to present their own countervailing evidence). 
 70. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (“[T]he complaining party shall 
demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, 
except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a 
respondent’s decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the 
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.”). 
 71. See Lee, supra note 3, at 482. 
 72. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003). 
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interpretation of these amendments.  The evolution of Title VII employment 
discrimination claims dealing with mixed motives started with the Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins73 and continued through Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa.74  In a mixed-motive case, as the name would 
suggest, the employee alleges that the employer’s decision was based on 
both legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, as well as illegitimate, 
discriminatory reasons, but that the illegitimate reasons actually drove the 
decision.75  In mixed-motive cases, the ultimate inquiry is whether a 
protected classification was a factor in an employer’s decision when it was 
made.76  The mixed-motive framework seeks to preserve the delicate 
balance between an employer’s right to choose how to run its business, and 
an employee’s right to work free from the discrimination.77 
In Hopkins, a female senior manager at Price Waterhouse brought a Title 
VII employment discrimination claim against her employers after being 
denied the opportunity to become a partner.78  The firm’s decisionmakers 
found her too aggressive and unfriendly, and subsequently told her to soften 
her image by behaving more femininely in order to be reconsidered for 
partnership.79  Because Price Waterhouse’s decision included a legitimate 
motive in addition to sex stereotyping, the Court sought to create a 
framework by which employees could demonstrate the existence of 
discriminatory behavior. 
The employee must first prove that an illegitimate motive led to an 
employment decision that negatively affected the employee.80  
Additionally, the employee must then show that the employer would not 
have made an identical decision even if that illegitimate motive did not 
exist.81 
To prove a mixed-motive discrimination claim, the employee may 
present either direct or circumstantial evidence.82  Appropriate evidence 
includes statements by the employer (specifically, the individual who made 
the decision) that demonstrate the discriminatory animus and that directly 
 
 73. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 74. 539 U.S. at 90. 
 75. See RICHEY, supra note 32, § 1:42. 
 76. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 241. 
 77. See id. at 239. 
 78. See id. at 231–32. 
 79. Id. at 235. For a full account of the facts of this case, see infra notes 209–23 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2006); see also Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 241–42 
(recognizing that Congress rejected the use of the phrase “solely because of” in Title VII and 
determining that the court must look at all factors, legitimate and illegitimate, in assessing 
liability for employment discrimination); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 847–48 
(9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (interpreting the language of § 2000e-2(m)). 
 81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 242 (“[A]n employer shall 
not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have 
come to the same decision regarding a particular person.”). 
 82. Costa, 539 U.S. at 100 (“‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may 
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’” (quoting Rogers v. 
Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957))). 
138 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
relate to the contested decision.83  However, “stray remarks” made by an 
employer are insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory animus, as are any 
statements susceptible to multiple interpretations any number of which are 
either discriminatory or nondiscriminatory.84 
Generally, employees face a relatively high burden in proving a case of 
mixed-motive discrimination, limiting the utility of this framework to 
employees.85 
B.  What Is Implicit Bias? 
Implicit biases are defined as the subconscious attitudes, feelings, and 
stereotypes that an individual may possess towards a given social group.86  
Such biases are assimilated through interactions with others and an 
individual’s culture, and are picked up throughout an individual’s 
lifetime.87  Yet, most individuals are entirely unaware that they possess any 
implicit biases.88  Notably, tests have found that implicit biases are not 
uncorrectable.  Individuals respond to (and try to eradicate) their implicit 
biases when they are made aware of them, or when they interact with a 
nonstereotypical member of the social group against which they hold an 
implicit bias.89 
This section of the Note explores the main tool that cognitive scientists 
use to measure the existence, extent, and impact of implicit biases.  This 
section further explains the changes that the workplace has seen over the 
past fifty years.  Finally, this section describes the ways in which employers 
make decisions, as well as the opportunities that implicit biases have to 
infect the decisionmaking process. 
1.  The Implicit Association Test 
In 1998, three social scientists founded Project Implicit to study the 
existence of implicit social thought.90  Project Implicit’s key tool to collect 
data on implicit attitudes is the IAT.91  Project Implicit and the IAT rely 
entirely on participants who frequent the website and take an IAT, so the 
 
 83. RICHEY, supra note 32, § 1:42. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury 
Selection:  The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and 
Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149 (2010); Eva Paterson et al., The Id, 
the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century:  Building upon Charles Lawrence’s 
Vision To Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 
1186 (2008). 
 87. Bennett, supra note 86, at 149. 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 149; Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 1124, 1129 (2012); Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1188. 
 89. See Bennett, supra note 86, at 153; Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 511. 
 90. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://projectimplicit.net/about.html (last visited Sept. 20, 
2013). 
 91. For a description of the IAT, see supra note 8.  Since 1998, Project Implicit’s 
website has collected more than three million IATs. Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1072. 
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sample of individuals who take the IAT may not be as representative of the 
general population as if a randomly selected sample were used.92  However, 
from these studies, social scientists have found that implicit biases are 
extremely common, separate from explicit biases, and that the IAT predicts 
behavior in the real world.93 
Generally, most takers of the IAT show favoritism for one social group 
over another, rather than having no biases at all.94  Further, takers prefer 
socially privileged characteristics—typically the preferred subject is the 
heterosexual, affluent, Catholic, Caucasian male.95  The IAT demonstrates 
that implicit biases predict how an individual will act towards members of 
both favored and disfavored groups better than explicit biases.96  
Additionally, because implicit biases are unknown to the individual that 
possesses them, they tend to come across in other ways that demonstrate 
“social warmth.”97 
2.  The Evolution of Employment Practices:  
Decisionmaking and Implicit Bias 
There are several factors that influence an employer’s decisionmaking 
process.  These include the structure of the workplace, the time spent 
contemplating the decision, the characteristics considered in the decision, 
and the employer’s contact with employees of dissimilar backgrounds. 
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the workplace has 
shifted to a more “fluid process of social interaction, perception, evaluation, 
and disbursement of opportunity.”98  Similarly, employees are working in 
jobs that rely on the employees’ ability to adapt to a variety of tasks, rather 
than focus on just one well-defined task.99  Employees are also increasingly 
required to work in teams.100  In other words, the workplace has shifted 
away from the rigid and linear systems of the past, which has enhanced the 
impact of implicit biases on the employment decisionmaking process.  
Whereas, in the past, many employment decisions were motivated by 
 
 92. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 955.  However, Greenwald and Krieger 
also note that the same findings would appear with a more representative sample, as well. Id. 
at 956. 
 93. Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1130–31. 
 94. See Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 474; see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 
8, at 955 (“[O]nly 18% of respondents [could] be judged implicitly neutral.”). 
 95. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 971; Kang & Lane, supra note 10, at 474. 
 96. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 954–55 (noting that individuals generally 
suppress any explicit biases that they are aware of, so as to not appear racist or sexist).  
 97. Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1073 (“[I]mplicit biases correlate[] with real-world 
behaviors like being friendly toward a target . . . and evaluating job candidates . . . .”).  
Examples of “social warmth” include:  (1) friendliness, (2) eye contact, and (3) spatial 
closeness. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 954–55. 
 98. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:  Towards a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99–108 (2003). 
 99. See id. at 101–02. 
 100. See id. 
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explicit biases, these decisions are now more commonly tainted by implicit 
biases.101   
The decisionmaking process can be divided into two “systems” to 
highlight how implicit biases pervade everyday thought.102  In “System I,” 
individuals make quick decisions that are largely based on intuition.103  
These decisions tend to be more prone to errors in judgment.104  If 
individuals remain unaware of their biases, they will not try to correct 
System I decisions.105  On the other hand, decisions made in “System II” 
tend to be more thought-out and based on deliberation, resulting in more 
accurate decisions.106  Thus, when individuals have to explain their 
decisionmaking processes, they tend to be less biased.107  The modern, fluid 
structure of the workplace lends itself to an increasing number of System I 
decisions. 108  
Employers also commonly rely on subjective characteristics to evaluate 
their employees.  In fact, employers often find subjective characteristics to 
be indispensable to the decisionmaking process and necessary to smooth the 
functioning of the workplace.109  However, implicit biases often invade 
these subjective decisions in a phenomenon referred to as “malleability of 
merit.”110  Through this sliding-scale process, employers will alter how 
much weight they attribute to any given qualification based on a gut feeling 
as to which candidate they believe can do the better job.111  This is 
especially true where either of two candidates is equally qualified.112 
The “social contact hypothesis” acts as a counterweight to this trend 
toward increased implicit bias–based decisions.  This hypothesis argues that 
close interactions with members of an “outgroup” against whom an 
individual may harbor an implicit bias may help to create a more positive 
 
 101. Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the 
Relational Level, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1435 (2008). 
 102. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 975–76. 
 103. Id.  For example, if an evaluator expects an African American individual to be 
violent, the evaluator will see evidence of violent behavior when presented with ambiguous 
behavior. See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1085. 
 104. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 974. 
 105. Id. at 976. 
 106. Id. at 975. 
 107. E.g., Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1178; Lee, supra note 3, at 486. 
 108. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 8, at 974–75 (discussing the use of “attribute 
substitution” to answer hard questions by asking easier ones). 
 109. See Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 470 (2003) (“[D]iscretionary acts are useful and necessary to 
any employer.”). 
 110. See Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1156–58;  see also Green, supra note 98, at 98–99 
(“The decisionmaker . . . may be entirely unaware of the influence of his stereotypes on his 
ultimate decision.”); Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 1086 (“[I]mplicit bias as measured by 
the IAT has been correlated with biased evaluations of job candidates.”). 
 111. See Kang et al., supra note 88, at 1156–57.  For an example of malleability of merit, 
see supra note 11. 
 112. See id.; Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Racism Without Racists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2008, at WK.10. 
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feeling towards that group as a whole.113  Taking this a step further, a 
workplace environment where individuals of various ingroups must rely on 
individuals from outgroups could help to reduce implicit biases by creating 
a stronger, more accurate understanding of each other, as opposed to a real 
or perceived disconnect between supervisors and their employees.114 
3.  Studies on the Effects of Race and Gender on Hiring Decisions 
Several studies have been conducted to discover and analyze the impact 
of unconscious attitudes and stereotypes on hiring decisions.  The subjects 
of these studies range from the effects of implicit biases on reviewing 
resumes to the impacts of anonymous hiring upon increased minority 
representation in the workplace. 
One such study examined how a particular name listed on a resume can 
affect an applicant’s chances of receiving an interview.115  By varying the 
quality of resumes used, as well as the names on each resume,116 the study 
found that—regardless of the quality of the application—an applicant with 
a “white” name will receive about one interview for every ten applications, 
while an applicant with a “black” name will receive one interview for every 
fifteen applications.117 
Interestingly, social scientists have also found that, despite the need for a 
subjective decision, implicit biases can be controlled through anonymous 
hiring.  Specifically, the blind audition system has worked wonders for 
equal employment opportunities within the major symphony orchestras in 
the United States, helping more females to get hired.118  Claudia Goldin and 
Cecelia Rouse’s study found that, by using blind auditions, the chances a 
woman had to advance to the final round of auditions or to secure a position 
within the orchestra increased by 25 percent.119 
 
 113. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 8, at 964; Kang & Banaji, supra note 8, at 
1101–05. 
 114. See Green, supra note 98, at 147. 
 115. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
Than Lakisha and Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 991 (2004). 
 116. The study utilized distinctive Caucasian names (like Brad and Allison) and 
distinctive African American names (like Latoya and Jermaine), randomly adding addresses 
in both affluent and “bad” neighborhoods. See id. at 995–96, 1003, 1012. 
 117. Id. at 998.  A related study also looked to the effects of implicit bias when gender is 
the differentiating factor. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed 
Criteria:  Redefining Merit To Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474 (2005).  The 
candidates, one male and one female were alternatively attributed the characteristics of 
“streetwise” and “booksmart.” Id. at 475. Participants consistently favored the male 
candidate, regardless of how he was characterized, and then accordingly described the 
criteria they found most relevant. Id. 
 118. See generally Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality:  The 
Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000). 
 119. Id. at 736. 
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C.  Pros and Cons:  The Current Debate Over Implicit Bias 
Given the recent cases120 and the abundance of scholarly articles dealing 
with implicit bias, individuals concerned with implicit bias’s role in future 
Title VII jurisprudence have created a heated debate on the topic.  This 
section presents the arguments against and in favor of the recognition of 
implicit bias in employment discrimination claims. 
1.  Disfavoring Implicit Bias:  Discretion and Deference 
The most frequent criticisms of implicit bias question the scientific 
validity of the IAT’s findings.121  While touted by supporters as hard 
evidence of the pervasiveness of implicit biases in today’s society,122 not all 
scholars are convinced that the IAT actually proves anything.  They claim 
that the “scientific” label attributed to the IAT studies may be nothing more 
than an honorific title attributed by scholars aiming to use the IAT to help 
reform antidiscrimination law, not an actual scientific validation of implicit 
bias’s pervasiveness.123 
One of the main features of this criticism arises from the difficulties of 
distinguishing causation from correlation.124  First, there are numerous 
theories that can explain the correlation between the IAT scores and real 
world behavior without resort to the popular theory that virtually everyone 
is inflicted with a biased attitude towards certain groups.125  Failure to 
eliminate these plausible alternatives may render any conclusions based on 
 
 120. See infra Part II. 
 121. See generally Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the 
Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006) [hereinafter Mitchell & Tetlock, 
Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading]; Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. 
Tetlock, Facts Do Matter:  A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737 (2009). But see 
Harriet M. Antczak, Problems at Daubert:  Expert Testimony in Title VII Sex Discrimination 
and Sexual Harassment Litigation, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 33, 36–38 (2011) 
(arguing that the premature exclusion of expert testimony in employment discrimination 
claims may do more harm than good). 
 122. See supra Part I.B.1–3. 
 123. Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, supra 
note 121, at 1029 (arguing that the IAT is claimed as scientifically sound by the “sheer 
volume of laboratory studies that implicit prejudice advocates cite, by the moral certitude 
with which [social scientists] apply psychological generalizations to the real world, and by 
the impressive credentials [social scientists] bring to the courtroom.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law:  Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
997, 1049 (2006) (“In short, whether attitudes predict behavior depends on the attitude, the 
context, and the person.”); see also Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the 
Perils of Mindreading, supra note 121, at 1094; infra notes 189, 192 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 
supra note 121, at 1064.  Such alternative theories include:  (1) the psychological phenomena 
that the brain will simplify a task by focusing on only one category, rather than both; (2) an 
individual’s fear of being labeled a bigot; (3) the creation of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”; (4) 
sympathy for, rather than bias against, certain protected groups; and (5) cultural 
expectations, rather than individual preferences. Id. at 1074–85; see also Maurice Wexler et 
al., Implicit Bias and Employment Law:  A Voyage into the Unknown, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 
1, 2013, at 1 (“[I]nfinite factors may influence an individual’s response on the IAT.”). 
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the IAT incomplete.126  Additionally, evaluators of the IAT have yet to 
delineate a specific range of IAT scores that can accurately predict when an 
implicit bias will lead to an actual discriminatory act.127  At this point, far 
too many unknown variables may exist to definitively say that the IAT 
reflects actual outward behavior for which an individual can be held 
accountable.128 
Another facet of the criticism involves the IAT data itself.  Evaluations of 
the IAT data demonstrate a low correlation to actual prejudicial behavior.129  
Therefore, many of those who demonstrate an implicit bias based on the 
IAT may never manifest any discriminatory behaviors.130  Essentially, the 
proclaimed predictive power of the IAT is turned on its head.  The 
persuasiveness of this predictive power is weakened even more in the 
employment context because of the training that decisionmakers, but not the 
average IAT taker, receive to effectively make employment-related 
decisions.131  Moreover, compilations of the data do not consider any 
outlier test results:  a small portion of IAT takers could be extremely biased, 
while average test takers may possess negligible biases.132  Finally, some 
may doubt that an unconscious bias could be evidenced by a mere 
millisecond difference in reaction times, especially when the IAT does not 
control for outside variables that may also affect these times.133 
Opponents express concern over the potential implications of adopting a 
test—like the IAT—that fails to meet the evidentiary standards of either the 
scientific or legal community.134  Critics believe that the implicit bias 
studies are not yet properly vetted in such a way as to give them credence as 
 
 126. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 
supra note 121, at 1096–97. 
 127. See id. at 1032; see also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup 
Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 163 (2004); 
Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 5 (“While it looks objective, [the IAT] lacks any objective 
connection to legally actionable behavior.”). 
 128. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 
supra note 121, at 1068–69. 
 129. See id. at 1100. 
 130. See id.; cf. supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 131. See, e.g., Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of 
Mindreading, supra note 121, at 1108–10; Outreach, Education & Technical Assistance, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/outreach/index.cfm 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (providing an example of the training available to employers). 
 132. Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, supra 
note 121, at 1103. 
 133. See id. at 1033, 1047; Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 4 (“One person’s responses on 
the IAT may also differ from day to day, and nothing in the test accounts for this 
variability.”). 
 134. See Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 
supra note 121, at 1028.  For example, these critics find it both impractical and unorthodox 
to force federal judicial appointees to take the IAT before confirmation. See id.  Other 
concerns arise from the potential that the IAT findings will lead to:  (1) “debiasing” as a 
remedy for unconscious discrimination, (2) invasions of schools to recondition children’s 
implicit biases, and (3) other related measures. See id. at 1027–28. 
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probative evidence in an antidiscrimination suit.135  Until the implicit bias 
theory reaches an acceptable level of scientific validity, the risk of “false 
positives” of implicit bias is too great to support reliance in the legal 
landscape.136 
Finally, the judiciary is concerned with several difficulties and 
uncertainties that arise when confronted with possible instances of implicit 
bias.  These cases often look suspicious, as if some discrimination has 
occurred, but the characteristic “smoking gun”—explicit discriminatory 
statements—present in much of the early Title VII litigation are largely 
absent.137  Similarly, the framework created by the early Title VII cases 
focused on intentional or conscious discrimination,138 and this framework 
may be unable to accommodate instances of unintentional discrimination 
without undergoing serious changes that the courts are currently unwilling 
to make.139 
Furthermore, the judiciary is reluctant to punish instances of implicit 
bias–related discrimination for several other reasons.  First, the courts view 
unconscious discrimination as less morally reprehensible than intentional 
discrimination, and they are therefore somewhat hesitant to punish it under 
the same framework that Title VII creates.140  Second, courts see an 
employer’s organizational structure and business-related choices as matters 
exclusively within an employer’s expertise and do not want to intervene.141  
Finally, many courts feel resignation because of the ease with which 
 
 135. See id. at 1056 (“[I]f the goal is application to the law, implicit prejudice research 
does not yet pass minimum standards of reliable science.”); see also Justin D. Levinson, 
Huajian Cai, & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias:  The Guilty/Not Guilty 
Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 187–88 (2010) (“Legal analysts have 
implicitly assumed that existing social cognition measures, many of which are carefully 
developed and rigorously tested (but not developed with the law in mind), are the only 
options for theory development in the legal context.”); Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 3 
(“[I]t is premature to incorporate the theory of implicit bias into employment discrimination 
law.”). 
 136. Mitchell & Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, supra 
note 121, at 1032–33. 
 137. See Green, supra note 98, at 105; Lee, supra note 3, at 482. 
 138. See supra Part I.A.  While the disparate impact framework may arise due to an 
unintentional effect of a business practice, the employer is likely at least somewhat aware of 
any impact on protected groups. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 
(1988) (noting that some unintentionally discriminatory employment practices may arise to 
the functional equivalent of intentional discrimination). 
 139. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 3, at 483; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights 
Perestroika:  Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1332–
33 (1998) (“[N]either our cultural understandings nor our jurisprudential models of 
discrimination illuminate or provide ways to reckon with [subtle, incremental forms of 
discrimination].”); Wexler et al., supra note 125, at 2 (“Importing the theory of implicit bias 
into the jurisprudence of employment law would require an equally nuanced and complex 
approach.”). 
 140. See Poirier, supra note 109, at 461; Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (pointing out the 
judiciary’s refusal to recognize several forms of employment discrimination). 
 141. See Green, supra note 98, at 118; Green & Kalev, supra note 101, at 1460; see also 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (“[C]ourts are generally less 
competent than employers to restructure business practices and [therefore should not attempt 
to do so].” (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978))). 
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employers can pass the buck and say that any discriminatory impact created 
by implicit biases was entirely beyond their control, effectively creating an 
affirmative defense to allegations of discrimination142—they do not want to 
spend time creating a remedy and wasting judicial resources when nearly 
zero likelihood of employee success exists. 
2.  Supporting Implicit Bias:  The Evolution of the Law 
One of Title VII’s main goals was to combat all forms of discrimination 
against members of protected groups.143  As such, supporters argue that 
recognizing implicit bias as a form of Title VII employment discrimination 
would be fully compatible with the intent of the sponsors and major 
proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.144  A new interpretation that 
recognizes unconscious discrimination would support Title VII even better 
than a refusal to acknowledge the impact of implicit biases on 
decisionmaking processes, because it would reflect the current state of 
discrimination in the workplace.145 
Additionally, if Title VII is to be viewed as a living statute that changes 
with social and behavioral developments, supporters assert that the 
invidious intent model of antidiscrimination laws represents an outdated 
view that runs contrary to the scientific studies.146  Further, as supporters 
point out, the EEOC has incorporated “unconscious stereotypes” into its 
definition of intentional discrimination.147  Noting that the judiciary’s 
interpretation of Title VII generally lags behind modern social trends,148 
supporters argue that the courts should consider these new scientific 
 
 142. Green & Kalev, supra note 101, at 1459–60; Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“Deliberate 
racism has been replaced by cognitive bias that influences the decision making and 
interactions involving [minority] workers.”). 
 143. See supra notes 3, 23 and accompanying text.  Compare this goal to the general 
observation that employees bringing claims against their employers for employment 
discrimination have an exceedingly slim chance of success. See, e.g., Ritenhouse, supra note 
23; Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1153 (2008) 
(noting the hurdles that employees bringing Title VII employment discrimination cases face 
at all stages of litigation). 
 144. See Lee, supra note 3, at 488; Shin, supra note 24, at 84. 
 145. Ritenhouse, supra note 23. 
 146. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias:  On 
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 753 (2001); Ann C. McGinley, 
¡Viva la Evolución!:  Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 415, 418 (2000); see also Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1181 (“[T]oday’s Court 
continues to operate in this ‘imaginary world’ despite mounting evidence that the Intent 
Doctrine is not only outdated, but almost entirely ineffective in addressing racial 
discrimination or inequality.”); Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“[C]ourts have lagged behind in 
addressing the prevalence of subtle racial discrimination that plagues today’s minority 
employees.”).  Viewing the intent requirement as the exception, rather than the rule, may 
bring American antidiscrimination jurisprudence into line with that of other countries. See 
Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1196–97 (identifying Canadian law, South African law, and 
several international treaties that do not require intent). 
 147. See Questions and Answers About Race and Color Discrimination in Employment, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
qanda_race_color.html (last updated May 16, 2006). 
 148. See, e.g., Paterson et al., supra note 86, at 1186; Ritenhouse, supra note 23. 
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findings in their Title VII jurisprudence, rather than allow these findings to 
be entirely disregarded or viewed too skeptically.149  Alternatively, 
supporters urge Congress to amend Title VII to reflect these modern trends. 
Finally, over the nearly fifty years since the enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, employers have discovered the types of liability they face for 
discriminatory employment decisions.  Now that these employers have the 
skill and ability to avoid “documenting, outwardly expressing, or retaining” 
evidence of any infringement of Title VII,150 supporters suggest that 
recognizing implicit bias would send a message that the government is 
serious about ending discrimination and is willing to hold these clever 
employers liable for their conduct, intentional or not.151 
II.  IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE COURTS:  IS IT REALLY 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION? 
Given Title VII’s historical application to cases of overt or invidious 
employment discrimination,152 the courts have not found a uniform way to 
recognize discrimination based on implicit bias.  While some courts have 
recognized implicit bias under Title VII, an almost equal number of courts 
have not.  This Part presents a number of cases exemplifying each 
approach. 
A.  Rejecting Implicit Bias Claims:  The Ambiguities 
of Employment Decisions 
Several courts have recognized the difficulties inherent in determining 
whether alleged employment discrimination resulted from unintentional 
stereotypes and attitudes or permissible discretion and legitimate business 
decisions.  On several occasions, these courts have determined that 
nondiscriminatory reasons, rather than any implicit biases, led to an 
employment decision.  These courts also typically reject the notion that 
implicit biases influence employment decisions at all.  This section explores 
a sample of recent cases decided by the Supreme Court and two district 
courts where implicit biases could have played a part in employers’ 
decisions, but where the courts have not felt the need to address such biases. 
 
 149. See Shin, supra note 24, at 80 (“If one were to approach the statute afresh rather than 
through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, one might very well read it to permit the 
imposition of liability for unconscious bias.”); Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“The plain 
language of Title VII does not mandate proof of purposeful or intentional discrimination.”). 
See generally Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context:  Social Framework 
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009) 
(arguing that social framework testimony on stereotyping and bias should be allowed to 
expand Title VII’s reach). 
 150. Lee, supra note 3, at 488; see also Ritenhouse, supra note 23 (“[D]ecision makers 
have become more and more sophisticated in hiding discriminatory intentions.”). 
 151. See Lee, supra note 3, at 488. 
 152. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (noting the traditional 
requirement of intent for Title VII employment discrimination claims). 
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In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,153 the Supreme Court heard an appeal 
in a class action lawsuit regarding a pattern and practice of discrimination 
against female Wal-Mart employees.154  The putative class consisted of 1.5 
million female employees155 claiming that a pattern and practice of 
discrimination existed against women because pay and promotion decisions 
were left to local managers’ broad, subjective discretion.156 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia expressed some skepticism when 
explaining the circumstances surrounding the named plaintiffs.157  The 
majority found that, without further, specific proof of nationwide 
discrimination, most store managers could not possibly have discriminated 
against all employees throughout the country because Wal-Mart’s 
employment policies specifically forbade discrimination on the basis of 
gender (and imposed penalties for violations).158  Highlighting an additional 
problem, Justice Scalia noted that, even if the class action were to go 
forward, all managers would simply claim that they applied “sex-neutral, 
performance-based criteria” to rebut any claim of discrimination.159  
Rather, the plaintiffs were required to identify a specific employment 
practice.160  Ultimately, the Court refused to certify the class.161 
One of the most recent rejections of an implicit bias legal theory occurred 
in Pippen v. Iowa, a class action lawsuit in which African American state 
employees brought claims of disparate impact against the thirty-seven 
departments of the state executive branch regarding the administration of 
Iowa’s merit-based employment hiring and promotion system.162  The crux 
of the employees’ claim was that the merit-based system was designed to 
 
 153. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 154. Id. at 2547–48. 
 155. Id. at 2547. 
 156. Id. at 2548 (“[Wal-Mart’s] strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias 
against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each 
one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers.”). 
 157. See id. at 2547–48.  For example, Betty Dukes was promoted and then later demoted 
after several disciplinary actions. See id. at 2547–48.  Similarly, Christine Kwapnoski held a 
number of positions, which included a supervisor position, but complained that the managers 
only screamed at the female employees and made several sexist comments. See id.  Finally, 
Edith Arana claimed that she was ignored by her store manager when inquiring about 
management training, but failed to apply directly for the position after being told, and was 
later fired for violating Wal-Mart’s timekeeping policy. See id.  Moreover, Justice Scalia 
found a social science analysis regarding the impact of stereotypes on employment 
discrimination to be too vague to provide sufficient evidence to establish this class. See id. at 
2553. 
 158. Id. at 2554–55 (“Left to their own devices most managers in any corporation . . . 
would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce 
no actionable disparity at all.”); see also id. at 2553.  Wal-Mart also had another policy of 
allowing local management the discretion to deal with local employment matters. See id. at 
2554. 
 159. Id. at 2555. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. at 2561. 
 162. Pippen v. Iowa, No. LACL107038, slip op. at 1 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2012), 
appeal filed, No. 12-0913 (Iowa Ct. App. May 16, 2012). 
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limit opportunities for African American employees,163 and it had 
effectively succumbed to favoritism, excluding the African American 
employees in violation of Title VII and the Iowa state law equivalent.164 
Iowa’s executive branch is divided into thirty-seven departments of 
varying responsibilities and funding, each possessing independent hiring 
authority.165  The merit-based system serves as a guidepost for each of 
these departments, requiring them to make all personnel decisions “solely 
on the basis of merit and fitness, to be ascertained by examinations or other 
appropriate screening methods.”166  The Department of Administrative 
Services (DAS) oversees the process for the entire executive branch and has 
the responsibility of developing guidelines for efficient employment 
decisionmaking, as well as overseeing the proper implementation of the 
guidelines in each department.167  The DAS carries out its duties by 
monitoring compliance throughout the executive branch, taking action to 
enforce the guidelines when necessary,168 and collecting data throughout 
the state regarding Iowa’s state employee affirmative action practices.169 
All job applicants similarly submit their applications through the DAS’s 
online system, or occasionally by hard copy.170  Despite the DAS’s role, 
each department still retains autonomy regarding all hiring and promotion 
decisions.171 
The DAS’s overall system can be divided into three steps that become 
increasingly more particularized the further along a candidate advances.172  
Once a given candidate advances past the DAS’s referral round, the 
departments are given greater leeway to individualize the screening and 
interview process based on specific job-related needs.173 
The class members’ anecdotal evidence included a number of situations 
in which they were incorrectly classified during the screening process, such 
 
 163. See id. at 3.  The class claim also highlights that the decisionmaking process was 
largely subjective and discretionary. Id. at 4. 
 164. See id. at 3. 
 165. See id. at 17. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. at 18. 
 168. See id. at 19. 
 169. Id. at 21.  The DAS’s data collection falls into three categories.  First, it collects “job 
information,” which includes the basics regarding the type of job, what minimum 
requirements applicants must meet, and pay. See id.  Second, the DAS collects “applicant 
information,” such as the age, race, and gender data provided by each applicant. See id.  
Finally, the DAS collects “application information,” which includes which individuals are 
competing for a job, how far along in the hiring process each applicant made it, and, 
occasionally, why a given applicant was not selected. See id. 
 170. Id. at 22. 
 171. Id. at 20, 22. 
 172. See id. at 21–22.  In the “Step One” referral process, the DAS screens all applicants 
to determine whether they meet the minimum requirements for the available job, advancing 
all qualified applicants to the relevant executive branch department’s individual hiring 
department. Id. at 21–22.  In “Step Two,” the hiring department performs its own screening 
process and selects potential candidates for interviews. Id. at 21.  Finally, “Step Three” 
consists of the actual interviews and selection of candidates for hire or promotion. Id. 
 173. Id. at 22–23 (“[P]ractices and procedures become more individualized to a given 
department and a particular job.”). 
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that they were effectively (and improperly) removed from consideration for 
an open position despite their qualifications.  Caucasian employees (and 
one Asian employee) were not alleged to have received the same 
treatment.174  In addition to the submission of statistical data,175 the class 
presented testimony regarding implicit bias from Dr. Anthony Greenwald 
and Dr. Cheryl Kaiser to further bolster their claim.176  Dr. Greenwald 
mainly focused on the IAT177 and his findings that all persons possess some 
level of implicit bias towards one race or another.178  Dr. Kaiser, on the 
other hand, focused on the range of implicit and explicit biases that 
everyone possesses,179 as well as how implicit biases could pervade 
subjective decisionmaking in ambiguous situations.180 Though stating that 
the merit-based system was specifically designed to avoid discrimination, 
the DAS also recognized that biases could potentially invade the hiring 
process.181 
Although the court considered the legislative history of Title VII and 
briefly addressed the changing nature of discrimination,182 the court still 
noted both the uniqueness of the class’s claims183 and the lack of precedent 
for its legal theory.184  While the court’s main holding rejected the class’s 
claims because of a failure to identify a specific employment practice,185 
the court also looked to whether the class could prove causation, even if the 
entire hiring process could be considered inseparable.186  After finding 
errors and ambiguities in the statistical analyses,187 the court turned its 
attention to the implicit bias testimony.188  First, the court generally focused 
on how implicit bias does not necessarily translate into actual prejudicial 
 
 174. See id. at 24–27.  In some instances, the DAS incorrectly reported an applicant as 
unqualified, and, when informed of the error, stated that the hiring department already had 
another candidate in mind. See id. at 24–25.  Other instances saw candidates rejected based 
upon criteria that were not included in the provided job description or based upon factors 
that were not evaluated during the interview process. See id. at 25–27.  Still other class 
members stated that they did not believe they were the most qualified for the job, or were 
rejected for reasons such as trying to work outside the hiring system. See id. at 26–27.  On 
one occasion, the department ceased hiring for a certain position altogether after a white 
applicant declined the offer. Id. at 26. 
 175. See id. at 31–36. 
 176. Id. at 27–31. 
 177. Id. at 28. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. at 30. 
 180. See id.  Dr. Kaiser also highlighted how racial cues pervade resumes even when the 
employer has not seen the applicant. Id. at 31. 
 181. Id. at 18. 
 182. See id. at 5. 
 183. Id. at 36. 
 184. Id. at 37. 
 185. See id. at 46 (“The ‘entire hiring process’ is not a particular employment practice.”). 
 186. Id. at 47. 
 187. See id. at 47–51.  For example, the court determined that the class’s statistical data 
regarding disparities in hiring and promoting African Americans did not consider how 
African American job applicants typically applied to more jobs overall than Caucasian 
applicants. Id. at 50. 
 188. See id. at 52. 
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behavior.189  Next, the court determined that any IAT results were 
inadmissible because there was no evidence that any Iowa decisionmakers 
took the IAT190 and because Dr. Greenwald did not evaluate any hiring files 
for the Iowa state employees.191  The mere plausibility that implicit bias 
could have played a role in the decisions was insufficient to show 
causation,192 especially when the class conceded that subjectivity and 
implicit bias could not be eliminated completely from the employment 
decisionmaking process.193  Because of the extreme variability and 
uncertainty as to actual causation, the class’s disparate impact claim was 
rejected.194 
Third, in Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.,195 Myrtle Thomas brought a 
disparate treatment claim of employment discrimination against her former 
employer, Eastman Kodak (Kodak).196  Thomas was laid off after working 
in the same office for thirteen years.  She was the only African American 
customer support representative.197   
The District of Massachusetts found that Kodak used a “Performance 
Appraisal” system to evaluate and reward each employee for meritorious 
job performance.198  Thomas’s evaluations were largely positive and also 
showed that she received several awards and bonuses for her job 
performance.199  Kodak eventually decided to create a new management 
position, to which Thomas applied.200  However, Thomas’s application was 
denied on the basis that she was unqualified, and a secretary named Claire 
Flannery was hired instead.201  Flannery’s promotion put her in a position 
to review Thomas, and was followed by several clashes between Thomas 
and Flannery.202  When Thomas received her annual evaluation that year, 
she discovered that Flannery gave her a lower rating than all of the other 
customer service representatives.203  Flannery claimed that Thomas could 
not receive a score higher than three because of the recent change in 
 
 189. See id. at 29. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 30. 
 192. See id. at 54 (calling the social science testimony an “opinion of conjecture, not 
proof of causation”).  Dr. Greenwald was also unable to rule out other race-neutral causes for 
the employment decisions. See id. at 30. 
 193. Id. at 53.  Ultimately, the court chose to defer to employers’ expertise in the business 
world, rather than getting involved. See id. 
 194. See id. at 51 (“The causes could be anything as egregious as explicit bias or as 
benign as extremely specific job requirements.”). 
 195. 18 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 1998), rev’d, 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 196. Id. at 131. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See id. (describing that the appraisal system rated each employee numerically in 
several areas, but also considered written comments). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 132. 
 201. Id.  At the time, Thomas was studying for a master’s degree in business and was 
more senior than Flannery. Id. 
 202. See id.  For example, Flannery gave Thomas the wrong time for a customer meeting 
and then refused to explain the incident to the customer. Id. 
 203. Id. 
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Thomas’s wage grade at Eastman Kodak.204  Regardless, Thomas still 
received pay raises for two of the three years she worked under Flannery, 
even though she was eventually laid off, as a result of her lower scores.205 
Finding for Kodak, the court determined that Thomas provided 
insufficient evidence to prove that Flannery was motivated by racial animus 
when annually evaluating Thomas’s performance.206  As such, the court 
found that Flannery and Thomas merely had conflicting personalities.207  
Thus, without a showing of discriminatory animus, the court declined to say 
that Thomas was discriminated against based merely on a presumably 
unfriendly office environment and suspiciously unfair treatment by an 
immediate supervisor.208 
B.  Recognizing Implicit Bias in the Courts:  More Than Mere Discretion 
While the Supreme Court and some lower courts have been hesitant to 
recognize the existence of implicit bias in cases alleging employment 
discrimination, such reluctance is not universal.  This section explores 
representative cases from various federal courts that have acknowledged not 
only the phenomenon of unconscious bias, but also the cognitive science 
research examining implicit biases and their effect on employment 
decisions. 
In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,209 the D.C. Circuit confronted one of 
the earliest cases dealing with mixed-motive discrimination.210  At the time, 
a senior partner and a policy board, elected by all Price Waterhouse 
partners, controlled all of the company’s business-related decisions.211  
Many partners were hired from within the company, through a formal 
review process.212  Once nominated for partnership, a candidate’s name was 
circulated to all partners, who then had the chance to comment on the 
candidate’s job performance.213  Partners who worked closely with the 
candidate were permitted to fill out a detailed “long-form” evaluation, while 
those who did not only filled out a “short-form” evaluation.214  Each 
evaluation provided reasoning for why the candidate should or should not 
be promoted.215  Once all evaluations were complete, a committee prepared 
a summary of all comments, added its own recommendations, and then 
provided these materials to the policy board.216  Upon review of the 
 
 204. Id.  Kodak had no such policy. See id. 
 205. See id. at 131–32. 
 206. See id. at 138. 
 207. See id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 210. Id. at 470. 
 211. Id. at 461. 
 212. See id. 
 213. Id. at 462. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. 
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materials, the policy board voted on the candidate, considering both 
individual merit and the business needs of the firm.217 
Ann Hopkins, the sole female employee in the Office of Government 
Services, was passed over for partner despite her outstanding 
qualifications218 and praise from the partners in her department.219  
Ultimately, the policy board’s rejection commentary pointed to Hopkins’s 
aggressive personality and her lack of interpersonal skills with clients and 
other staff members alike.220  Her defenders within the policy board, 
however, stated that many male candidates and partners were much worse 
than Hopkins, and that she would be an excellent partner if the policy board 
could ignore her “macho” characteristics.221 
Without outright denying Hopkins’s bid for partner, the policy board 
determined that she needed to undergo a “quality control review.”  This 
review would assuage any concerns, and would permit her to demonstrate 
her skills to the partners by working more closely with them.222  To give 
Hopkins a little extra help, one of the partners even told her that she should 
act and dress more like a woman to help reduce her macho image.223 
On the one hand, the lower court found that the criticism of Hopkins’s 
aggressive personality was genuine and unrelated to her gender.224  
However, the court also found that the Price Waterhouse corporate culture 
was rife with sexual stereotyping, which the firm took no action to 
discourage.225  In the end, the district court determined that it would be 
unable to evaluate the exact effect that gender stereotyping played on Price 
Waterhouse partnership decisions.226 
Relying on the testimony of an expert on stereotyping, Dr. Susan 
Fiske,227 the D.C. Circuit found that the “disappointed stereotypical 
expectations of male partners played a ‘major determining role’ in the 
firm’s decision not to make Hopkins a partner.”228  Finding an intent 
requirement less necessary, the court looked to the sophistication and 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id.  The district court noted that, not only was Hopkins a skilled businesswoman 
capable of generating business and closing high-profile contracts for the firm, but she also 
brought in the most business in the year she was considered for partner and billed more 
hours than any other partner candidate. Id. 
 219. See id.  Citing her past performance, the partners provided a “flattering appraisal of 
her work,” and enthusiastically pushed for Hopkins’s promotion to partner. Id. 
 220. See id. at 463 (noting that the policy board found Hopkins “overly aggressive, 
unduly harsh, impatient with staff, and very demanding”). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  However, this quality control review would prove futile for Hopkins once her 
supervising partners later became opposed to her candidacy for partnership. See id. 
 223. Id. (“[The partner] advised her to walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress 
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”). 
 224. See id. at 464. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. at 464–65 
 227. Id. at 465, 467.  Dr. Fiske’s testimony highlighted the combination of factors that 
supported Hopkins’s claim of stereotyping, such as the lack of other female candidates, 
ambiguous criteria for partnership, and the lack of objective standards. See id. 
 228. Id. 
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educational background of the alleged discriminators and decided that 
stereotyping is much less excusable for individuals with the experience and 
education that Price Waterhouse partners possessed.229  Finally, by 
emphasizing the unintentional form that stereotyping sometimes takes, the 
D.C. Circuit broke new ground by stating that unconscious or unintentional 
discrimination is equally as serious and harmful as overt, invidious 
discrimination.  As such, the court had an equal duty to protect against this 
unconscious discrimination.230 
Meanwhile, on appeal from the district court’s decision, the First Circuit 
handled the facts of Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.231 very differently from 
the district court.  First, the court highlighted that Thomas was the only 
African American customer service representative working for Eastman 
Kodak’s Wellesley office at the time.232  Further, the court delved deeper 
into an analysis of Eastman Kodak’s evaluation process.233  For example, 
the First Circuit noted that the evaluations were placed on a company-wide 
curve that ranked the employees.234  Moreover, the First Circuit placed 
greater weight on Thomas’s past performance than the district court.  The 
First Circuit also highlighted that:  (1) Thomas’s office was never 
dissatisfied with her work prior to Flannery’s arrival, (2) Eastman Kodak 
evaluated Thomas to perform at a level above and beyond her colleagues, 
and (3) Thomas received praise from both her customers and her 
coworkers.235 
The First Circuit stated that the requirements of disparate treatment could 
be satisfied even if an employer discriminates based on unconscious 
biases,236 notably shifting away from the court’s past requirements of 
invidious intent to discriminate.  Denouncing the district court’s conclusion 
that Flannery’s behavior merely showed evidence of an unwelcoming office 
environment and a personality conflict with Thomas,237 the First Circuit 
noted that Flannery’s behavior was also possibly inappropriate and 
unprofessional.238  Relying purely on the change in Thomas’s evaluation 
scores pre- and post-Flannery, the First Circuit held that strong evidence of 
discrimination existed,239 reversing the district court’s dismissal of 
Thomas’s claim.240 
 
 229. See id. at 468. 
 230. See id. at 469 (“[T]he fact that some or all of the partners at Price Waterhouse may 
have been unaware of that motivation, even within themselves, neither alters the fact of its 
existence nor excuses it.”). 
 231. 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 232. Id. at 42. 
 233. See id. at 44. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. at 43. 
 236. See id. at 58. 
 237. See id. at 64; see also supra Part II.A. 
 238. See Thomas, 183 F.3d at 64. 
 239. Id. at 62. 
 240. Id. at 65. 
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Most recently, the Eastern District of Wisconsin considered the role of 
implicit bias in employment decisions in Kimble v. Wisconsin Department 
of Workforce Development.241 In Kimble, an African American supervisor 
working in the Equal Rights Division (ERD) for twenty-nine years, brought 
suit against his employer, the Wisconsin Department of Workforce 
Development, alleging race and gender discrimination after he was denied a 
raise.242 
The Court found that, while the ERD had provisions for awarding merit-
based raises and bonuses,243 these provisions were extremely general, 
necessitating the addition of actual criteria.244  However, the ERD never 
established any specific policies.245  As a result, the ERD essentially had 
free reign to subjectively decide when to award raises and bonuses, without 
any objective checks against the decisionmaker’s biases.  The ERD’s chief 
decisionmaker, J. Sheehan Donoghue, who had no first-hand experience 
with Kimble,246 determined that Kimble’s performance did not merit a 
raise,247 claiming to have relied on the annual evaluations of Kimble’s other 
supervisors.248 
However, at trial, no supervisors stated that they were asked for any 
recommendations.249  Moreover, had Donoghue consulted these 
recommendations as she claimed, she would have seen that Kimble’s 
reviews were mostly positive.250  But Donoghue was so detached from 
Kimble that she failed to realize that he felt neglected at work,251 instead 
viewing him as an incompetent employee.252 
Finding that Donoghue discriminated against Kimble, the court relied on 
the subjectivity of Donoghue’s decisionmaking process and the lack of any 
meaningful review of her decisions.253  Given these factors, the court found 
an opening through which any biases or stereotypes could infect the 
decisionmaking process.254  Specifically, this court became the first to 
explicitly recognize and rely on implicit bias cognitive studies in reaching 
its holding.255 
 
 241. 690 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
 242. Id. at 767. 
 243. Id. at 768. 
 244. See id. at 772. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See id.  In fact, the extent of Donoghue’s direct contact with Kimble occurred on the 
occasions when she used his office to store her purse and papers while on site. See id. at 776. 
 247. Id. at 772. 
 248. Id. at 773. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See id. at 777 (noting that Kimble was unable to participate at any employment 
meetings without having another employee corroborate what he was saying). 
 252. Id. at 776–77. 
 253. See id. at 776. 
 254. See id. (“Individuals draw lines and create categories based in part on race, gender 
and ethnicity, and the stereotypes they create can bias how they process and interpret 
information and how they judge other people.”). 
 255. See Kimble, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (citing the major literature on implicit biases). 
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III.  THE NECESSITY OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
Currently, there is no easy way to incorporate implicit bias into 
employment discrimination law.  Practically, Congress is so deadlocked in 
general that a bipartisan agreement to make a major structural change to 
Title VII seems unrealistic,256 and Congress would likely wait for intense 
public support before even considering this type of reform.257  However, 
now is a perfect time for a judicial intervention, or at least a willingness to 
explore possible solutions to this newly identified type of employment 
discrimination.  Although courts have expressed an unwillingness to 
intervene in matters best left to employer discretion,258 they have 
previously taken it upon themselves to modify the Title VII framework to 
address newly discovered forms of discrimination.259 
First, this Part argues that the cases presented in Part II.A were 
improperly decided, because the courts failed to seriously consider the 
effects of implicit bias.  Additionally, this Part asserts three reasons—
purposivism, textualism, and consistency through the Title VII legal 
framework—that favor the judiciary using Title VII as an interventional 
means to eliminate unconscious bias in the employment setting.  Next, this 
Part demonstrates that judicial intervention is necessary if the courts want to 
serve the main aim of Title VII—eliminating all forms of employment 
discrimination.  Then, this Part advocates that a broader interpretation of the 
language of Title VII is applicable to cases alleging implicit bias–induced 
employment discrimination.  Finally, this Part explains how the current 
burden-shifting framework under disparate impact, disparate treatment, and 
mixed-motive cases can be applied with equal force and minimal changes to 
cases alleging implicit bias as a form of employment discrimination. 
A.  The Pervasiveness of Implicit Bias:  Why They Got It Wrong 
While cases like Dukes, Pippen, and Thomas clearly recognize the 
practical difficulties of identifying implicit bias in potential instances of 
employment discrimination,260 each makes the faulty assumption that the 
impact of implicit biases is so negligible or its existence so unlikely that it 
could be ignored entirely. 
This major flaw in the Dukes Court’s reasoning261 was obvious, as 
Justice Scalia tried to ascertain the male managers’ motivations and 
effectively rejected the possibility that the store managers had an improper 
motive, unconscious or otherwise.262  By refusing to consider the 
proposition that the Wal-Mart managers could have discriminated against 
the female employees, the Dukes majority equally rejected the notion that 
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 259. See supra Part I.A. 
 260. See supra Part II.A. 
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implicit biases are pervasive throughout society263 and have a real impact 
on decisionmaking.264  On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
demonstrated the possibility of recognizing implicit bias, while still denying 
relief to a gigantic class of individuals.265 
The Pippen court went to similar extreme ends to avoid giving credence 
to the implicit bias theory in a massive class action suit against the entire 
state executive branch.266  The crux of the error that the Iowa state court 
made in this case stemmed from that court’s refusal to find causation based 
upon the statistical evidence and cognitive studies on implicit bias.267  By 
refusing to treat Dr. Greenwald’s implicit bias analysis seriously, the Iowa 
state district court essentially found that—despite the plausibility268 that 
implicit bias played a role in the executive branch’s hiring practices—the 
lack of specific IAT data regarding the implicit attitudes of Iowa state 
employees was compelling enough to totally disregard the entire theory.269  
The court, in effect, supported the view that for an implicit bias theory to 
succeed, the employer whose practices are at issue should be required to 
take the IAT.  This view presents the practical problem, however, of 
invading the privacy of the employers at issue.  If the court willingly 
accepted other criticisms of the IAT, it surely would have recognized that 
forcing the IAT upon employers would impede business duties, and would 
fall back on the popular reasoning that everyone has implicit biases.270 
Moreover, the Iowa state district court in Thomas made the equally faulty 
assumption that, even though Thomas was the only African American 
customer support representative at the Wellesley Kodak office, Thomas’s 
treatment by Flannery was due only to their incompatible personalities and 
an unfriendly (but not discriminatory) workplace.271  Here, the court 
essentially rejected the premise of the social contact theory, which states 
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that contact with diverse individuals reduces the impact of implicit bias.272  
Because Thomas was the only African American employee in that office, it 
would have been more prudent of the court to be skeptical of Flannery’s 
motives, rather than deferential to them.273 
By rejecting the social science findings and, thus, evidence of the 
existence of implicit bias, the courts in each of these three cases effectively 
undermined Title VII’s primary goal of eliminating all forms of 
discrimination.274  Without an expansion of Title VII to cover implicit bias, 
many employees remain powerless to seek a remedy for this type of 
employment discrimination.  This is especially true when virtually no court 
is willing to experiment with variations on the accepted legal framework to 
develop a workable manner in which to recognize a remedy for 
discrimination caused by implicit bias. 
B.  Ending All Forms of Employment Discrimination Means Recognizing 
That Discrimination Is Not Only Based on Conscious Intent 
Judicial recognition of implicit biases within the Title VII framework 
would greatly further the legislative goals of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.275  This would not be the first time that the judiciary has taken an 
active role in expanding Title VII when new, potentially harmful and 
discriminatory employment practices are revealed.276  Given the cognitive 
science research on implicit biases, such a development has been brought to 
the courts’ attention on several occasions.277 
Title VII’s broad purpose is to end all forms of employment 
discrimination.278  When the Supreme Court recognized that certain 
aptitude tests served no legitimate purpose and had the effect of depriving 
protected groups of employment opportunities, it adopted the disparate 
impact formulation.279  Similarly, both the courts and Congress adopted the 
mixed-motive framework upon recognizing that an employer could escape 
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liability for an employment decision that was motivated by discriminatory 
animus, but tempered by a legitimate business purpose.280  Once again, with 
the legal impact of implicit biases becoming more prevalent and 
contentious,281 the courts must adopt a new framework to protect 
employees from a newly discovered form of discrimination.282 
Subjective hiring and promotion decisionmaking have much the same 
effect as an aptitude test,283 and is full of opportunities through which 
implicit biases can infect employers’ choices.284  With both subjective 
decisionmaking and aptitude tests, employees protected under Title VII 
suffer a disadvantage, because these practices allow employers to 
discriminate without actually intending to do so.285  Regardless, the 
elimination of all types of employment discrimination necessarily includes 
protecting employees against the effects of unconscious discrimination.  
Thus, judicial recognition of, and protection against, implicit biases is 
wholly inherent in any purposive interpretation of Title VII.286 
C.  The Plain Language of Title VII Supports Broadening Its Reach 
Title VII, in its current incarnation, does not read as an outright bar to 
recognizing implicit bias.287  Rather, Title VII can—and should—be read 
more broadly by the courts to recognize that a case need not involve 
intentional discrimination to merit a remedy.  Cases like Kimble and the 
First Circuit’s handling of Thomas demonstrate that Title VII is capable of 
remedying the impact of implicit biases without radically rewriting the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.288 
First, looking to § 2000e-2(a), the only indicator of intent is the 
prohibition against discriminating “because of” race and other protected 
characteristics.289  A strict reading of this phrase interprets “because of” to 
require overt discrimination against a member of a protected group.  
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However, a broader reading of the phrase “because of” encompasses other 
situations where the discrimination occurs as a result of any type of bias.290  
In fact, discriminating “because of” a protected characteristic must include 
implicit bias–induced discrimination that causes the employer to treat an 
employee differently.  Though the intent to discriminate is often 
unconscious when implicit bias is involved, implicit bias may still lead 
decisionmakers to act in a certain discriminatory way.291  Further, though 
the courts are hesitant to punish behavior over which an employer may not 
have control, individuals that possess implicit biases are not helpless292—if 
anything, recognition of implicit bias liability will lead decisionmakers to 
take active steps to ensure that their decisions are legitimate. 
Second, § 2000e-2(a) also encompasses any other decisions that 
“adversely affect” an employee’s status.293  Again, an adverse effect need 
not be caused by an obvious and invidious intent to discriminate.294  Any 
type of bias that arises out of an unconscious attitude or stereotype that the 
employer possesses can cause an adverse effect.295  A decision to promote a 
Caucasian employee over an African American employee merely based on 
a gut instinct rather than a bona fide difference in qualifications still causes 
an adverse effect that would not otherwise exist if both employees were 
Caucasian.  The African American employee must then establish that 
implicit bias impacted the employer’s decision, showing that this effect 
actually did occur because of the African American employee’s race.  Thus, 
a broad reading of “adversely affect” encompasses implicit biases, without 
the need to radically alter Title VII.296 
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D.  Shifting Burdens Maintain the Status Quo of Employment 
Discrimination Claims and Implicit Bias 
Because the broad language of Title VII supports considerations of 
implicit bias, courts merely need to incorporate the implicit bias research 
into the traditional burden-shifting standard to adequately combat all of 
forms of employment discrimination.  Title VII’s legal framework 
addresses virtually every type of employment discrimination claim.297  
Because of the overall success of this framework, there is little need to 
change it when recognizing a claim premised on an implicit bias theory.  
Courts can maintain this framework to preserve Title VII’s integrity while 
still recognizing claims alleging implicit bias discrimination.298 
Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development is one 
example of how Title VII jurisprudence can evolve within the current 
framework.299  Kimble successfully incorporated the social science of 
implicit bias into the disparate treatment framework without creating any 
new burden-shifting test.300 
Instead of requiring employees to present a prima facie case of overt 
discrimination before shifting the burden to defendants, employees can be 
required to present evidence of implicit bias in action.  This can be achieved 
by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a plausible inference that an implicit 
bias affected an employer’s decision.  Evidence supporting this inference 
may include the employee’s treatment at the job and an employment 
decision inconsistent with the treatment of similarly situated employees.  
However, merely pointing to an unfavorable employment outcome and a 
few ambiguous situations that may evidence implicit bias would be 
insufficient.  Thus, employees should be required to demonstrate that they 
were adversely affected by an overly subjective decisionmaking process 
that naturally allowed for unconscious employment discrimination.301  A 
lack of meaningful oversight and the absence of sufficient guidelines or 
objective factors to balance out the subjective nature of the decisions would 
provide additional evidence.302 
Though employers may not be aware of unconscious discrimination, they 
would still have the opportunity to rebut presumptions of discrimination by 
showing that a legitimate business practice or decision was the true reason 
behind any alleged discriminatory behavior.  Employers can point to the 
 
the Civil Rights Act has not been touched since the 1991 amendments, and inaction is not 
necessarily a choice. 
 297. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 298. Since the enactment of Title VII, and subsequent interpretations of the statute and its 
amendments, the Supreme Court has created slight variations on the traditional burden-
shifting scheme for employment discrimination claims. See supra Part I.A.2–3. 
 299. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra Part II.A (discussing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes; Pippen v. Iowa; and 
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.). 
 302. See supra Part II.A (discussing Dukes, Pippen, Thomas, and the factors the 
respective courts considered in evaluating the discrimination claims). 
2013] EVERYONE’S A LITTLE BIT RACIST? 161 
lack of gut-feeling decisions by demonstrating a conscientious 
consideration of all candidates’ merit-based credentials.303 
When the burden shifts back to the employee to respond to the 
employer’s explanation, the employee can use the full gamut of Title VII 
responses—statistical evidence,304 differential treatment of similarly 
situated individuals,305 and other similar evidentiary proof—to show that 
the employer’s explanation is either not necessarily true or heretofore 
unknown to the employer’s decisionmaking personnel.  Going further, 
however, by directly using the IAT to test employers for implicit biases at 
this point is premature, and given all the controversy surrounding the 
IAT,306 may never provide adequate proof that implicit biases exist.  
Similarly, interpretations of the IAT’s data should be allowed, but only as 
highly persuasive evidence of implicit bias.307 
The current requirement that employees must identify a specific business 
practice should be removed temporarily, until better indicators of implicit 
bias are discovered.  In cases of implicit bias, this requirement often places 
far too high a burden on employees, and also runs counter to recent findings 
regarding implicit biases308 and intent.309  Often, unconscious biases 
manifest themselves uncontrollably in small, but significant ways 
throughout all aspects of the hiring and promotion process.310  As such, a 
specific, liability-inducing employment practice will not exist.311  Requiring 
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plaintiffs to point to specific practices would, therefore, be almost entirely 
inconsistent with social science’s unconscious discrimination findings. 
To assuage any concerns the courts may have in recognizing the 
existence of an implicit bias, and to protect the employers’ business 
interests while preventing frivolous lawsuits, the courts should provide a 
less severe remedy than that which is available under the more traditional 
Title VII claims. The courts have sufficient experience in dealing with 
unintentional discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act312 
—finding an analogous remedy, even if only a temporary one, for implicit 
bias claims should not be too taxing or difficult. 
A higher potential for liability will provide employers with some 
incentive to ensure that those responsible for making hiring and promotion 
decisions are consciously aware of, and capable of guarding against, the 
invasion of any implicit biases in the decisionmaking process.  They may 
even develop new ways to counter the implicit bias studies in court, leading 
in turn to further innovation by those seeking to prove implicit biases exist.  
Alternatively, employers have plausible, cost-effective options available to 
protect themselves from a broader interpretation of Title VII.313 
Effectively, judicial recognition could reduce unconscious discrimination 
in the same way that the current version of Title VII has reduced overt, 
invidious discrimination.  Mere acceptance of the preliminary implicit bias 
studies could be the step needed to eliminate this new form of 
discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Title VII has greatly reduced instances of overt employment 
discrimination, implicit bias is still very much a pervasive reality.  The 
ambiguities and uncertainties associated with implicit bias further 
complicate the ability to provide a remedy to employees who have been 
adversely affected by their employers’ implicit bias–related decisions.  
Currently, because the courts are hesitant to fully embrace the implicit bias 
studies, Title VII’s main goal of ending all forms of employment 
discrimination is not being faithfully served.  Until the courts broadly 
recognize the existence of implicit bias, this problem will remain a serious 
reality to many female and minority employees who are denied 
advancement opportunities. 
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Although the courts may currently lack the ability to accurately recognize 
implicit biases, and legislatures may be unwilling to create a new type of 
liability for discrimination without intent, the courts’ continued willingness 
to experiment with implicit bias within the Title VII framework will place 
them in a better position to provide adversely affected employees with a 
remedy.  Hopefully, increased judicial recognition of the impact of implicit 
biases will lead to a truly merit-based workplace, in which female and 
minority employees have equal opportunities of advancement, free from 
decisionmaking personnel’s unconscious attitudes. 
 
